The Fragile Sword: Presidentialism and Accountability Under Informal Institutions

Executive accountability is of utmost relevance in Presidential systems. Yet, the scope, content, and limits of presidential accountability mechanisms are both shaped and constrained by informal institutions, which may complement or undermine the written framework. Through a three-stage study of Mexico (hegemonic party stage, pluralist stage, and populist stage), this paper highlights how informal institutions may interplay with formal mechanisms, diminishing presidential accountability, particularly impeachment and criminal liability vis-à-vis a catalogue of offenses. Under pluralistic conditions, accountability mechanisms require complicated inter-party agreements in successive legislative bodies to be initiated or imposed, making them susceptible to blockade by the standing president due to effective party control, political dependence of the prosecutor, party alliances, or open horse-trading. The paper focuses on three informal institutions that significantly reshaped accountability mechanisms at different stages in Mexico: Dedazo—the practice of salient presidents in choosing their successors among party ranks—, political exile after finishing the constitutionally foreseen single-term rule and the so-called “meta-constitutional faculties”, i.e., informal powers vested to presidents in light of controlling the federal administration within a highly centralized party system. The paper concludes that, in strong presidential regimes, even though accountability mechanisms are informally diminished, the formal framework exercises a symbolic Damocles sword function, mildly limiting presidential behavior and promoting the self-interested maintenance of alliances sufficient to block the imposition of formal sanctions.