A Window of Adversity? Explaining Norway’s Generous Support for its Fossil Fuels Industry During the COVID-19 Crisis

Why did Norway, a country with ambitious international climate commitments, extend exceptionally generous support to its oil and gas industry during the COVID-19 crisis? This article extends Mildenberger's (2020) theory of double representation to explain how economic crises shape the political economy of decarbonization in corporatist systems. We argue that political urgency and acute economic uncertainty consolidate the power of carbon-intensive actors, as governments and lawmakers rely on them for information, legitimacy, and rapid implementation. This advantage is amplified when political actors are vulnerable: under minority governments that shift authority toward parliament, or when left-leaning parties are electorally weakened and dependent on unions with ties to fossil fuel industries. Under these conditions, institutional mechanisms that typically impede ambitious climate policy shift from veto power to appropriation, allowing carbon-intensive interests to gain enhanced leverage over policy design. Drawing on in-depth interviews with Norwegian policymakers, union leaders, and other key stakeholders, we trace the process through which Norway’s stimulus response evolved into an exceptionally generous tax package to oil and gas industry. Our findings challenge optimistic views of crises as automatic “windows of opportunity” for green transformation. Instead, we show how corporatist systems of “negotiated accommodation” can produce “windows of adversity” that entrench fossil fuel dependence. Our argument carries broader lessons for other corporatist economies facing similar shocks.