The Intellectual Divergence on the Concept of Reason Between Lukacs and Horkheimer When Dealing with Authority and Resistance

Stalin, as one of the most controversial historical figures of the past century, alongside his ideology, Stalinism—which is characterized by authoritarianism and the cult of personality—has stirred many disagreements among intellectuals. Such disagreements are not limited to intellectuals of different camps or schools, but, more interestingly, they linger among intellectuals of the same camp. One example is the different receptions and attitudes of Lukacs and Horkheimer toward Stalin and Stalinism. Despite both being known as Marxist philosophers, Lukacs and Horkheimer had significantly different intellectual foundations. These differences are shown in their drastically different attitudes toward Stalin and Stalinism, and can be exemplified by a comparison between Lukacs' The Destruction of Reason and Horkheimer’s The End of Reason. At the heart of this divergence lies their contrasting philosophicohistorical diagnoses of reason itself. For Lukacs, the enemy of human emancipation comes from the irrational philosophy, namely mysticism, fatalism, and the rejection of historical materialism. While for Horkheimer, reason itself has become instrumentalized and turned into a tool of domination. This fundamental disagreement over the nature of reason determined their opposing stances toward Stalin and Stalinism, and moreover, authority and resistance. In Enzo Traverso’s comment on The Destruction of Reason, he states that in the West, the work “was considered a piece of Stalinist propaganda not deserving more than superficial scrutiny, whereas the orthodox communist intelligentsia looked suspiciously at the work of a heretic Marxist (Traverso, 2021).” Traverso’s statement points out the polarity in the interpretation of The Destruction of Reason and, in doing so, reveals the work's Stalinist inclination. Unlike Lukacs, however, Horkheimer’s stance toward Stalinism in The End of Reason is rather negative and critical. Horkheimer organizes his critique around the concept of instrumental reason, arguing that Stalin and Stalinism, as both historical reality and political theory, essentially being an endorsement of instrumental reason. Based on this intellectual divergence between Lukacs and Horkheimer when dealing with authority and resistance, I shall argue that the case of Lukacs and Horkheimer provides an example that shows how different understandings of reason can lead to different attitudes towards authority and resistance, thus examining the role of reason in giving social movements and activists the right to resist in general. This paper also aims to demonstrate the divergence between Lukacs and Horkheimer as foundational tension within the Marxist tradition when dealing with authority and resistance, since Lukács attempts to resist through authority, where emancipation is achieved by wielding a revolutionary counter-authority. Horkheimer, in contrast, advocates for resistance to authority, where emancipation depends on the perpetual, critical negation of all instrumentalizing power; thus answering the question of how reason can grant revolutionaries, reformers, or activists the authority to replace or improve the existing regimes.