Compound Representation

Political representation is understood as a relationship “between the entity that represents and the entity that is represented” (Castiglione and Warren 2006:6). This relationship is often considered in fairly static terms where the representative is the agent and the represented the principal. This notion is much more relevant for a unitary nation-state than it is for a federal state (or a non-state polity with federal features such as the European Union), which is marked by a much more complex configuration of compound representation. The notion of compound representation can be traced back to James Madison’s notion of compound republic. The core features are: a) multiple channels of representation, structured along institutional lines as well as along levels of governing; b) the different channels are organized in accordance with a system of checks and balances and divisions of work and competence; and c) the overall system is based on the notion of popular sovereignty. The implication is that all institutions are ultimately answerable to the people. The key question that the compound republic was supposed to provide a response to was: “Can people both individually and collectively maintain basic control over their institutions of government in a way that both allows for the exercise of freedom and imposes limits upon government authorities?”(Ostrom 2008:138). Such a system should allow for the autonomous operation of concurrent systems of government wherein people are maintaining multiple self-governing communities of interest.(Ostrom 2008:133) The purpose of this paper is threefold. First is to outline the basic nature of the compound republic in representational terms, drawing mainly on Pitkin’s categories. How are authorization and accountability relations configured and structured? What forms and combinations of substantive representation (standing for and acting for) are involved? Second is to discuss what the constructivist turn to representation can add to this. Does its underlining of representation’s dynamic, ambiguous and reflexive character prompt the need for reconsidering the Pitkin-inspired account? If so, how? Or would its main contribution be to improve our understanding of how federal systems operate in practice (through dynamic ebbs and flows of centralization and decentralization and changing powers and competencies with implications for how constituencies are configured)? Or is the constructivist approach of particular value for detecting the pathological features of such systems (for instance by serving as early warnings of defederalization dynamics through the analysis of claims-making patterns)? Third is to illustrate some of the issues with reference to complex and contested polities such as Canada and the European Union.