Europol and the Politics of Autonomy in a Fragmenting European Union

Over the past two decades, Europol has undergone significant institutional expansion, becoming a key agency in the European Union’s internal security. Successive mandate reforms, increased operational competences and budgetary resources have led many analyses to highlight Europol’s growing capacity to deliver “added value” in areas such as counter-terrorism, organised crime, and cross-border intelligence coordination. This expansion has seen a growing level of trust from member states, reinforced by the European Commission’s increased security and defence spending. While Europol remains formally dependent on member states, it has gradually developed agenda-setting capacity through technical expertise, information asymmetries, and its role as a central hub for intelligence exchange. At the same time, its autonomy remains politically contingent and vulnerable to changes in the broader political environment. This article assesses Europol’s capacity to act as an autonomous agency and to continue delivering added value in a period marked by declining political support and increasingly inward-oriented national politics. Drawing on principal–agent theory, it examines how democratic backsliding in several major member states and renewed sovereignty concerns have narrowed the space for EU agency autonomy, despite continued institutional investment. External pressures, particularly shifts in transatlantic relations during the Trump presidency, further expose these constraints. The article contributes to debates on European integration and institutional change by arguing that Europol’s added value depends not only on formal competences and resources, but also on sustained political commitment and democratic trust among member states.