Europeanization in Times of War: The External Incentives Model under Geopolitical Enlargement

he Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has triggered what is increasingly described as a geopolitical turn in European Union enlargement. In response to the war, the EU acted with unprecedented speed, granting candidate status to the Association Trio (Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia) despite their previously uncertain membership prospects, while simultaneously accelerating integration efforts in the Western Balkans. According to the External Incentives Model (EIM), which explains Europeanization under EU enlargement, heightened credibility of membership should incentivize candidate countries to accelerate rule adoption and reforms. However, in the context of large-scale war on the European continent and intensifying geopolitical competition, the assumptions of the EIM may come under strain. Security considerations could weaken EU conditionality and membership standards. This paper assesses the performance of the EIM under these new circumstances by testing the two competing expectations. It asks whether external incentives in the context of geopolitical enlargement continue to promote Europeanization, as the EIM predicts, or whether their effects are mitigated. To address this question, the paper proceeds along two lines. First, it examines Europeanization trends in nine candidate countries since 2022, assessing whether the pace and quality of reforms have changed compared to the pre-war period. Second, it analyzes whether EU conditionality and membership standards have been weakened by examining EU discourse and recent enlargement decisions with a particular focus on lesson from the Georgian case. The findings contribute to refining or revising the theoretical expectations of the EIM.