Thursday 09:30 - 11:00 CET (10/12/2026) Building: Social Science Department, Room: Aula Ovale
Abstract
In many cities, organised crime groups establish themselves as dominant controllers of illicit markets, extracting payments from businesses and residents through extortion and protection rackets. Criminological research has examined how these groups are internally organised and how they confront, evade, or co-opt the authorities, yet far less is known about what happens when a rival group challenges an entrenched organisation. This paper addresses that gap. It develops a game-theoretic framework in which an established criminal group and a prospective challenger compete for the same illegal market, each deciding simultaneously how much to extort from victims and how much violence to direct against its rival over territory. Law enforcement is represented not as a single undifferentiated pressure but as two distinct interventions: one targeting extortion, and the other targeting inter-group violence, with variable intensities. The paper examines how the level and focus of policing shape both groups' choices and identifies the conditions under which the encounter produces violent confrontation rather than tacit territorial accommodation. A key finding is that the two forms of enforcement can work against one another: efforts focused solely on suppressing violence may inadvertently increase the extortion burden on victims, whereas efforts focused on extortion reduce both. The findings carry clear implications for anti-extortion strategy and for protecting communities exposed to organised criminal control. The paper concludes by noting that the framework extends naturally to other settings of competitive coercive extraction, notably ransomware and cyber-extortion, where enforcement agencies face a comparable choice between disrupting payments and disrupting attacks.