Kant, Science and Politics

In the Critique of Pure Reason, in the Introduction to the second edition, Kant repeatedly makes use of the metaphor of the ‘secure path’ of science. (Bvii, Bviii, Bix, Bxiv, Bxv, Bxviii, Bxxiii, Bxxx, Bxxxvi) He wants to know whether "someone’s treatment of the cognitions pertaining to reason’s business does or does not follow the secure path of a science" (Bvii), and he thinks this can be ascertained by looking at the results of that treatment or the progress towards a purpose or how collaborators work together to achieve the respective purpose. He thinks that logic has been following the secure path of science "from the earliest times" (Bviii), but that this "it owes entirely to its limitations". (Bix) Kant has in mind here the fact that logic abstracts from all objects of cognition and their differences; by contrast, it is more difficult for reason to "enter upon the secure path of science", when it deals not only with itself, but also with objects. Similarly, Kant thinks that mathematics has been following the secure path of science "since the earliest times to which the history of human reason extends" (Bx), and that this was facilitated by the fact that, as in the case of logic, here too, reason deals only with itself. (Bxi) Natural sciences too, Kant claims, have been put on the secure path of a science "after it had for so many centuries been nothing more than a mere groping about" (Bxiv); this has been facilitated by the idea that "we must, in accordance with what reason itself puts into nature, seek in nature […] whatever reason must learn from nature". (Bxiv) Kant’s focus, however, is on metaphysics, as a speculative cognition by reason, independent from experience and, unlike mathematics, "through mere concepts" and not "through the application of concept to intuition". (Bxiv) Regarding the three criteria of a treatment of cognition that is on the secure path of science (the results, the progress towards its purpose and the agreement of collaborators), Kant notes that metaphysics fails all three "although metaphysics is older than all the other sciences". (Bxiv) Kant thinks that "metaphysics will be on the secure path of a science", if we assume that the objects of our cognition must conform to our cognition, rather than the cognitions, to objects. (Bxviii-xix) Kant hopes to subject metaphysics "to a complete revolution" following the example of geometricians and natural scientists. He regards the Critique as a treatise on the method of metaphysics and thinks that this critique will bring metaphysics on the secure path of a science. (xxiii) However, we know that Kant’s Critical philosophy does not only refer to the cognitions of pure theoretical or speculative reason, but also to those of pure practical reason (in the Critique of Practical Reason), as well as judgement (in the Critique of Judgement, which is supposed to conclude Kant’s Critical project). The aim of this section is to examine Kant’s view of a practical metaphysics (both in ethics and politico-juridical philosophy) that is on the secure path of a science. One way to approach this question (P1) is by examining the relation between theoretical and practical cognitions. On some accounts, it is clear that the demands of various forms of scientisms (social Darwinism or science-informed neoliberalism) should not outweigh those of practical philosophy, such as the moral law or the Universal Principle of Right, which inform human rights and democratic policies); however, history shows that this is exactly what happened at various junctures in time, and, moreover, that this is likely to happen again, once a new form of scientism emerges, reclaiming loyalty in the name of science. (Köller 2014) Another possible approach (P2) attempts to account for the genuinely objective and contentful character of the requirements of moral theory by offering a new account of Kant’s conception of moral theory as a philosophical science; the argument is that Kant’s moral philosophy relies on the central features of the revolutionary method of Newtonian natural science for the investigation of practical cognition. (Palatnik 2015) Yet another approach (P3) examines Kant’s use of intrinsically legal and political language in the description of the "land of truth", where the acquisition of theoretical cognitions seems to follow the same principles as the appropriation of power over land, security and justified possession. (A235/B295) This makes possible a more detailed examination of the relation in Kant (and not only) between science and politics, scientific language and political language. A further approach (P4) focuses on the concept of autonomy; according to a standard interpretation, autonomy represents self-government, in light of and out of respect for the moral law. Yet, it is argued that this is a too narrow interpretation of autonomy; this notion should instead be understood as an overarching conception of self-government, including perhaps also a view of epistemic autonomous agency, but also a view of autonomy centred on the moral law. Other approaches are open for investigation, for instance, (P5) the link between some of Kant’s claims in anthropology and the conclusion of recent commentators concerning an alleged racism in Kant and a needed reorientation of Kant scholarship. On the occasion of the 300th anniversary of Kant’s birth, this section proposes to investigate the relation in Kant between science, ethics and politics, both as part of the five panels presented above (P1-5, to be convened by, respectively, Thomas Köller, Zach Vereb, Jakob Rendl, Bettina Lange and Sorin Baiasu) and as part of other approaches, which are invited as starting points for additional panels.