Kantian and Liberal Conceptions of Autonomy

Abstract

This panel probes the relationship between Kantian and liberal conceptions of autonomy. Autonomy as self-government has been a focus in liberal political theory for many years (see e.g. Christman and Anderson 2005). According to the core concept, persons are autonomous if they are competent in ‘self-rule’ i.e. in avoiding the determination of their choices by manipulative or coercive forces – whether internal or external to the person - and in setting and achieving their own goals in life (see for example Arneson 1991; Christman and Anderson 2005, 2/3). Interpretations of autonomy have been classified ‘procedural’, ‘substantive’ and ‘relational’. Procedural conceptions deem an action or decision autonomous if it is the result of an individual’s critical reflection and evaluation, regardless of its content (Bratman 2007; Dworkin 1989; Ekstrom 1993; Frankfurt 1999). Critics have argued that the process by which individuals arrive at preferences is not always autonomous and that (therefore) autonomy requires substantive content (Benson 1991; Christman 1991; Hill 1989, 2000; Korsgaard 1996; Wolf 1990). Proponents of a relational conception of autonomy have criticized substantive accounts for being unduly prescriptive and universalist, and procedural accounts for being too individualistic and abstract (Christman 2004; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Meyers 1989, 2005; Narayan 2002; Nedelsky 1989; Meyers 1989, 2005). Kantian conceptions of individual autonomy are usually classed as substantive and distinguished from procedural liberal conceptions of individual autonomy. Kantian autonomy is interpreted as self-government in light of and out of respect for the moral law and it is assumed that Kant consistently draws a sharp contrast between this moral autonomy and heteronomous determinations of motivations, whether originating from outside the heteronomously determined person or from her own desires. Yet these classifications have been questioned, and from both directions. So it has been argued on the one hand that liberal conceptions of individual autonomy in fact rely on substantive normative commitments or reasons, in particular to justify interference with individual autonomy (see e.g. Gaus 2005) and conversely that the sharp contrast between autonomy and heteronomy is not in fact sustained in Kant’s own reasoning. He for example classed following one’s own desires as autonomous (see e.g. Waldron 2005). The relationship between liberal individual autonomy and substantive morality has more widely been a focus of research and debate in the literature on autonomy (see e.g. how Oshana has problematised more and less autonomous ways of engaging with socially given identities). A further research question is the role individual and collective (or universalist) autonomy respectively have in determining what should be regarded as an authoritative or legitimate decision or motivation. Here too the issues are much more complex than a simple liberal/individualist versus Kantian/collectivist contrast. In particular liberal accounts of autonomy have used the capacity to respond to putative challenges from others with authority as a criterion for individual authenticity. Conversely, while it is individuals who determine their relationship to the Kantian moral law, they do so as rational beings rather than as the particular individuals they happen to be.

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