Individual Autonomy as Critical Appropriation

Liberal political models based on individual autonomy have been criticized for lacking respect toward cultural differences and intensifying rugged individualism. Nevertheless, autonomy's emphasis on human beings' reflective and critical capacities, combined with the liberal ideal of equal respect, is still a powerful conceptual tool to problematize the oppressive element of the status quo. For this reason, I suggest restructuring the concept instead of rejecting it. In this paper, I propose a relational and situated conception of individual autonomy, which I call autonomy as critical appropriation. The paper consists of three parts. In the first section, I challenge the two elements prevalent in the mainstream conception of individual autonomy: authenticity and non-manipulation. The mainstream conception assumes the authenticity of an individual, being true to one's inner voice instead of being a derivative of others. However, it deals with this conceptual element with an overtly individualistic approach, neglecting that comprehending a person's desires is incomplete without considering how collective narratives are woven into them. Also, the mainstream conception distinguishes manipulation, a distortive influence on an agent's psychological abilities, from other benign influences and describes it as serious harm to autonomy. However, I cast doubts about whether there is a satisfying way to make such a distinction. Identifying true desires undistorted by manipulated factors is an ambiguous, if not impossible, task for individuals situated at the intersection of conflicting ideological demands. In the second section, I explore possible ways to untie individual autonomy from these ambiguous or demanding conceptual elements, drawing on the feminist theory of relational autonomy (Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000; Westlund 2009; Nedelsky 2011; Veltman & Piper 2014). While not all conceptions of relational autonomy can ally with liberal agendas, I identify conceptual resources compatible with my purpose of building an alternative liberal model. In the third section, I propose autonomy as critical appropriation: a capacity to construct one's life by appropriating existing life-constructing materials and justifying one's judgment from critical challenges posed by meaningful others. Critical appropriation consists of two central components: (a) appropriation, whether an agent reinterprets and situates existing norms and life projects in a way that they fit into her experiences and given social contexts; and (b) the act of reason-giving, whether an agent is capable of engaging in a critical dialogue about her decisions with actual or imagined others with whom she has meaningful social relationships. In conclusion, I explain why critical appropriation is a more useful conception of autonomy for contemporary societies dealing with the issues of pluralism and cultural imperialism.