Feminism, Individual Freedom, and Duties to Self. A Kantian Approac

Feminism has had a sometimes strained relationship with freedom: although it has typically been animated by a willingness to liberate women from sexist oppression or masculine domination, from the moment it has sought to extend this liberation across cultures and national borders, it has been accused of perpetuating and reinforcing another kind of domination, namely, an imperialist domination. What are we to think of this tension? Might the individual freedom cherished by cosmopolitans not after all be a universal value? Is it impossible for a feminist to be a cosmopolitan without being an imperialist? In this paper, I will answer these questions in the negative and mobilise Kant’s practical philosophy to support my position. My argument will proceed in four steps. I will start by presenting some feminist debates on global gender justice and relational autonomy in order to illustrate the ambivalent relationship feminism has with individual freedom when it unfolds in a context of cultural diversity. Secondly, I will show that the main protagonists of these debates cannot but ultimately rely on a shared acknowledgment of the universal value of individual freedom. Thirdly, drawing on the Kantian duty of rightful honour, I will argue that the universal value of individual freedom places limits on what women are morally authorised to consent to, and incidentally, on the socio-relational environment in which they may legitimately find themselves. Correlatively, I will suggest that by insisting on the preservation of one’s juridical personality, the Kantian duty of rightful honour also allows us to envisage a feminism that is cosmopolitan without being imperialist. Fourthly and finally, I will propose two ways in which feminist concerns with sexist oppression might be framed within a broader Kantian concern with the depersonification of women.