Individual and Collective Autonomy : Coercive Forces, Procedural Independence and Normative Reasoning

The aim of this paper is to develop the core concept of individual autonomy in a way which is capable of achieving two aims. The first is to retain the enlightening aspects of extant conceptions of autonomy – procedural (Bratman 2007; Dworkin 1989; Ekstrom 1993; Frankfurt 1999), substantive (Benson 1991; Christman 1991; Hill 1989, 2000; Korsgaard 1996; Wolf 1990) and relational (Christman 2004; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Meyers 1989, 2005; Narayan 2002; Nedelsky 1989; Meyers 1989, 2005) - while minimizing their problematic aspects. The second is that the redeveloped concept of autonomy can be used to guide policy formation. I will use examples from transport – behaviour, preferences and policy - in relation to the second aim. There is general agreement in the philosophical literature that autonomy at its core consists in competence in ‘self-rule’ i.e. in avoiding the determination of one’s choices by manipulative or coercive forces – whether internal or external to the person - and in setting and achieving one’s own goals in life (see for example Arneson 1991; Christman and Anderson 2005, 2/3). It has been demonstrated in relational accounts of individual autonomy that individuals’ motivations, preferences and choices are (almost) always socially embedded, usually socially influenced and sometimes the result of manipulation by others. In the paper I will first use those insights to characterise a. social embeddedness b. social influence and c. social manipulation. According to procedural accounts, evidence of (attempts at) coercion may justify interventions to protect or restore individuals’ independent evaluation and/or decision making. The accounts of coercion used are often modelled on a one-to-one relationship: "A coerces B if ….". While I appreciate that this is not to be taken as literally just a relation between two individuals, I will nevertheless argue that this model is incapable to account adequately for social embeddedness, social influence and social manipulation. I will develop the criteria for coercion from individual coercive behaviour towards coercive social forces and then evaluate what kinds of social dimension to individuals’ motivation, preferences and decision making justify intervention. The last section of the paper is concerned with the nature, legitimacy and feasibility of interventions. Substantive accounts have made explicit (collective or universalist) normative dimensions of individual autonomy. I will highlight such normative dimensions in relation to transport behaviour, preferences and policy and indicate how a Kantian universalizability criterion may be useful when accounting for legitimate or normatively required interventions, both at the individual level (taking personal responsibility) and at the collective level (developing policy) of autonomy.