The growing literature on intergroup hostility and polarization often assumes that cooling hostility between political camps strengthens democracy by promoting mutual tolerance, acceptance of electoral defeat and resistance to elite attacks on institutions. Some recent findings challenge this assumption: (de)polarization and democratic attitudes may move independently, non-linearly, or even in opposite directions (Broockman et al. 2023; Canalejo-Molero et al. 2026; Janssen & Turkenburg 2025; Frantz et al. 2025). This Workshop brings together comparativists, political psychologists, theorists and experimental researchers to explain when, why, and under what conditions reducing political hostility improves (or fails to improve) the health of democracy.
Affective polarization, broadly defined as mutual dislike between political camps, has become one of the most studied phenomena in comparative political behavior. Hence, governments, foundations, and NGOs invest in depolarization initiatives, often justified as a means of protecting democracy. These efforts rest on an assumption that reducing intergroup hostility improves citizens’ democratic attitudes and vigilance against transgressions.
While there is evidence supporting a macro relationship between political hostility, affective polarization and democracy (Kingzette et al. 2021; Orhan 2022), a wave of research beginning with Broockman et al. (2023) and Voelkel et al. (2023) has also challenged whether and to what extent this assumption holds for individuals and with changing attitudes. Interventions can shift perceptions of political common ground without reducing affective polarization (Canalejo-Molero et al. 2026; Sodoma & Sharp 2026), while reductions in hostility do not necessarily translate into stronger democratic attitudes. Recent research instead points to a relationship that is curvilinear (Janssen & Turkenburg 2025), causally bidirectional with backsliding itself generating polarization (Gessler & Wunsch 2025), and conditional on the institutional structure and social entrenchment of political animus (Harteveld et al. 2026). Depolarization toward groups espousing undemocratic positions may even increase tolerance of those positions (Sodoma & Sharp 2026), while professed commitment to democratic norms can coexist with support for punishing an out-party (Kokkonen & Harteveld 2025).
The workshop aims at bringing together scholars from different subfields to clarify the democratic benefits and dangers of reducing intergroup hostility and depolarization attempts, both from an empirical and theoretical perspective.
The growing literature on intergroup hostility and polarization often assumes that cooling hostility between political camps strengthens democracy by promoting mutual tolerance, acceptance of electoral defeat and resistance to elite attacks on institutions. Some recent findings challenge this assumption: (de)polarization and democratic attitudes may move independently, non-linearly, or even in opposite directions (Broockman et al. 2023; Canalejo-Molero et al. 2026; Janssen & Turkenburg 2025; Frantz et al. 2025). This Workshop brings together comparativists, political psychologists, theorists and experimental researchers to explain when, why, and under what conditions reducing political hostility improves (or fails to improve) the health of democracy.
Affective polarization, broadly defined as mutual dislike between political camps, has become one of the most studied phenomena in comparative political behavior. Hence, governments, foundations, and NGOs invest in depolarization initiatives, often justified as a means of protecting democracy. These efforts rest on an assumption that reducing intergroup hostility improves citizens’ democratic attitudes and vigilance against transgressions.
While there is evidence supporting a macro relationship between political hostility, affective polarization and democracy (Kingzette et al. 2021; Orhan 2022), a wave of research beginning with Broockman et al. (2023) and Voelkel et al. (2023) has also challenged whether and to what extent this assumption holds for individuals and with changing attitudes. Interventions can shift perceptions of political common ground without reducing affective polarization (Canalejo-Molero et al. 2026; Sodoma & Sharp 2026), while reductions in hostility do not necessarily translate into stronger democratic attitudes. Recent research instead points to a relationship that is curvilinear (Janssen & Turkenburg 2025), causally bidirectional with backsliding itself generating polarization (Gessler & Wunsch 2025), and conditional on the institutional structure and social entrenchment of political animus (Harteveld et al. 2026). Depolarization toward groups espousing undemocratic positions may even increase tolerance of those positions (Sodoma & Sharp 2026), while professed commitment to democratic norms can coexist with support for punishing an out-party (Kokkonen & Harteveld 2025).
The workshop aims at bringing together scholars from different subfields to clarify the democratic benefits and dangers of reducing intergroup hostility and depolarization attempts, both from an empirical and theoretical perspective.
Under what conditions does reducing (affective) polarization improve the resilience of democracy?
Are there differences between mechanisms (e.g. misperception correction, empathy, shared-identity priming)?
What are risks of depolarization, such as false balance or tolerance of norm violations or anti-democratic stances?
What measures and designs allow researchers to test the link between reduced hostility and a democratic resilience?
How are political animosity and democracy linked across party systems and stable versus backsliding democracies?
(quasi-)experimental studies testing whether interventions improve democratic attitudes and resilience
identifying unintended or adverse consequences of hostility reduction interventions for democracy
Evaluations of real-world NGO- or government-led programmes aimed at reducing animosity
Scope conditions and moderators of the link between political animosity and democracy (e.g. institutions)
Measurement of democratic attitudes, hostility and polarization
Studies on multiparty adaptations of depolarization interventions and their effects on democratic resilience
the relation of different concepts (intergroup hostility, partisan animus, affective polarization) to democracy outcomes
Comparative studies of the polarization-democratic-backsliding link outside the US
Broockman, D. E., Kalla, J. L., & Westwood, S. J. (2023). Does affective polarization undermine democratic norms or accountability? Maybe not. American Journal of Political Science, 67(3), 808-828.
Canalejo-Molero, A., Cicchi, L., Ferreira da Silva, F., Garzia, D., Reiljan, A. & Trechsel, A.H. (2026). Priming common European and democratic values does not reduce affective polarization. European Political Science Review, 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773926100496
Frantz, E., Kendall-Taylor, A., Şimşek, C. & Wright, J. (2025). Democratic Backsliding and Endogenous Polarization. Political Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-025-10094-8
Gessler, T. & Wunsch, N. (2025). A new regime divide? Democratic backsliding, attitudes towards democracy and affective polarization. European Journal of Political Research, 1593-1617. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12751
Harteveld, E., Berntzen, L.E., Kokkonen, A., Kelsall, H., Linde, J. & Dahlberg, S. (2026). The (Alleged) Consequences of Affective Polarization: A Survey Experiment in Nine Democracies. European Journal of Political Research. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1475676526101273
Hartman, R., Blakey, W., Womick, J. et al. (2022). Interventions to reduce partisan animosity. Nature Human Behaviour, 6, 1194-1205. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-022-01442-3
Janssen, L. & Turkenburg, E. (2025). Breaking free from linear assumptions: Unravelling the relationship between affective polarization and democratic support. European Journal of Political Research, 1465-1479. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12725
Kokkonen, A. & Harteveld, E. (2025). Affective polarization, democratic norms, and support for elite transgression. In M. Torcal & E. Harteveld (eds.), Handbook of Affective Polarization. Edward Elgar, 388-401. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781035310609.00041
Sodoma, K.A. & Sharp, D. (2026). Empathic Engagement and Polarization in Multi-Party Democracies: The Case of the Populist Radical Right. In H. Samaržija & R. McKenna (eds.), The European Face of Political Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan, 245-273. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-27049-8_12
Talisse, Robert B. „Depolarization Without Reconciliation“. Critical Review 35, Nr. 4 (2023): 426–49. https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2023.2285116.
Voelkel, J. G., Chu, J., Stagnaro, M. N., Mernyk, J. S., Redekopp, C., Pink, S. L., ... & Willer, R. (2023). Interventions reducing affective polarization do not necessarily improve anti-democratic attitudes. Nature human behaviour, 7(1), 55-64.
Voelkel, J.G., Stagnaro, M.N., Chu, J. et al. (2024). Megastudy testing 25 treatments to reduce antidemocratic attitudes and partisan animosity. Science, 386(6719). https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adh4764
1: Under what conditions does reducing (affective) polarization improve the resilience of democracy?
2: Are there differences between mechanisms (e.g. misperception correction, empathy, shared-identity priming)?
3: What are risks of depolarization, such as false balance or tolerance of norm violations or anti-democratic stances?
4: What measures and designs allow researchers to test the link between reduced hostility and a democratic resilience?
5: How are political animosity and democracy linked across party systems and stable versus backsliding democracies?
1: (quasi-)experimental studies testing whether interventions improve democratic attitudes and resilience
2: identifying unintended or adverse consequences of hostility reduction interventions for democracy
3: evaluations of real-world NGO- or government-led programmes aimed at reducing animosity
4: Scope conditions and moderators of the link between political animosity and democracy (e.g. institutions)
5: Measurement of democratic attitudes, hostility and polarization
6: Studies on multiparty adaptations of interventions and their effects on democratic resilience
7: the relation of different concepts (intergroup hostility, partisan animosity, polarization) to democracy
