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Why the Right to Collective Self-determination of a People Cannot Support Extensive Immigration Control

Political Theory
Immigration
Ethics
P04

Wednesday 16:00 - 17:00 BST (27/01/2021)

Abstract

Speaker: Elaine Lok-Lam Yim, University of Hong Kong | In this paper, Elaine Yim challenges an influential line of arguments in support of immigration control that appeals to the moral right of collective self-determination of a people. The collective-self-determination argument for immigration control states that: when potential immigrants enter the territory of the receiving state without authorisation, they commit a moral wrong by contravening the right of collective self-determination of a people. To challenge this argument, Elaine delineates the scope of the legitimate authority of a state with respect to its citizens and non-citizens as derived from the citizen’s right to collective self-determination. According to traditional theories of political legitimacy, a state has the morally legitimate authority to rule its citizens because it represents them. State’s rule is the mechanism by which citizens exercise their right to collective self-determination. This provides a moral justification for state’s extensive power over its citizens. However, the same does not apply to the state’s exercise of power with respect to non-citizens. The state does not represent non-citizens and is not a mechanism by which non-citizens exercise their right to self-determination. Instead of enhancing non-citizens’ autonomy, state’s powers over non-citizens are mere coercion that diminishes the autonomy of non-citizens. This forms the basis for my two-level theory of legitimate authority: the scope of legitimate authority of a state with respect non-citizens is narrower than that with respect to citizens. Specifically, Elaine argues that the scope of legitimate authority of a state with respect to non-citizens is limited to what is sufficient for attaining the collective autonomy of the citizens, whereas the scope of legitimate authority of a state with respect to citizens is not limited to a sufficientarian standard. Collective autonomy is attained when citizens: (i) have the requisite capacity to self-rule; (ii) have an ‘adequate’ range of options as to what kinds of collective projects they may pursue; (iii) are able to make choices independently, that is, free from coercion and manipulation. Once these three conditions are met, citizens may have further interests in self-determination – for instance, they may want to pursue some specific collective projects that require the exclusion of potential immigrants endorsing a different set of values – but such interests go beyond the sufficientarian standard and cannot give rise to moral duties on the part of non-citizens. The implication is that, if a people can be collectively autonomous under an ‘open border’ policy, then no right to exclude potential immigrants can be established from the right to collective self-determination.