Computational Institutional Analysis of Bureaucracies

Abstract

Bureaucracies are crucial to policy performance and qualify political regimes. Theories portray them as inertial or responsive, entrepreneurial or risk-averse, siloed or collaborative, vulnerable to capture or stalwart. Such diversity is ascribed to differences in the configurations of rules that shape their structure, coordination, and agency. However, the mechanisms connecting specific rule configurations to models of bureaucratic agency and delivered goods and values can seldom rely on systematic and credible evidence as prescriptions may need. This Panel invites Papers that discuss how computational tools can help gauge, render, and evaluate these mechanisms and the conditions for scaling them up.

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