Kant's "Mixed Metaethics" in the Groundwork

Abstract

It is a controversial issue whether Kant holds a realist or anti-realist view in metaethics. Even though there is a longstanding tradition to think of Kant’s ethics as a model of constructivism, there are a number of authors that locate Kant on the realist side. More recently, it has been declared that Kant belongs neither to the realists’ nor to the constructivists’ camp exclusively but holds a hybrid view, especially in the Groundwork (most prominently Stern, but also Irwin and Bacin). In my talk I will reinforce and refine this view. Whereas Rawls claims influentially that Kant’s moral epistemology and his theory of bindingness lead us away from realism, scholars like Wood or Guyer deny that the moral law itself is constructed (other than special duties). Alternatively, they propose that Kant offers a foundation for morality in a realist conception of values, namely the value of humanity (Wood) or the value of autonomy (Guyer, partly Stern). As I will argue, Kant’s moral epistemology does not place him in opposition to moral realism. Besides this, there are good reasons to ascribe a realist account to him, but the kind of realism Kant puts forward does not concern values but the moral law. Furthermore, it is specific for the Groundwork that he combines a realist understanding of the truth of the moral law with an understanding of its bindingness that refers to internal structures of human agency, a characteristic that is unfamiliar to metaethical realism. I will develop these claims in three steps: (i) As I will show, Kant relies on common moral cognition because even if there is widespread disagreement about special obligations, there is a high grade of stability in the beliefs of various people about the content of the fundamental moral law. Overlooked by his constructivist interpreters, Kant comes close to an intuitionist and realism-friendly methodology in Section I of the Groundwork, starting from facts of our non-mediated moral consciousness. (ii) Kant’s further understanding of the moral law is established by his reference to pure rational beings. Relying on his much-discussed use of the concepts of self-legislation and autonomy, I will claim that these concepts play a major role for his moral epistemology, but do not imply the view that the moral law is self-given. (iii) While the moral law is only constitutive, but not normative for the will of pure rational beings, it is normative for the human will. In general terms, the moral law has authority over the empirical will, because the empirical will is subordinated under the rational will and the moral law is constitutive for the rational will. Although this is similar to the divine command theory in that one will commands another will, I think it is clear that Kant uses a constitutivist strategy in the Groundwork for his account of moral bindingness to show not only that the moral law is authoritative for the rational will, but that the rational will is fundamental to the empirical will. The aim of the talk is to separate Kant’s views on moral epistemology, moral bindingness and the ontology of the moral law in order to give a better understanding of Kant’s mixed metaethics in the Groundwork. At the end of the talk, I will say something about what we gain if we ascribe to Kant a realistic understanding of the moral law.