Party Regulation and Electoral Success: Revisiting the Cartel Party

Abstract

The link between institutions and outcomes has interested political scientists nearly as long as the discipline has existed. Only in recent years, however, has there been an expansion of the definition of ‘institutions,’ leading to new exploration of how 'institutions matter.’ One aspect of how institutions matter, which has until recently remained under-explored, is the relationship between party regulation and the success (or failure) of electoral contenders. The cartel party thesis suggests that the availability of state funding to political parties, the allocation mechanisms of public subsidies, and other regulatory characteristics of the party law such as registration requirements may affect the degree of competition within the party system. With this panel we aim to encourage the exploration of the connection (or the lack thereof) between party law and electoral success. We invite papers that revisit the cartel party thesis and analyze the conditions that encourage or discourage the perpetuation of a party cartel. Papers which deal with this puzzle in a comparative manner or papers which explore the definition of what constitutes a party cartel and how we recognize it when we see it are particularly welcome.

Title	Details
Cartelised Party Systems: What, Where and How?	View Paper Details
Comparative Gatekeeper Provisions in Party and Electoral Law: Sustaining the Cartel?	View Paper Details
Breaking the Cartel: The Effect of State Regulation on Newcomers’ Entry	View Paper Details
The Impact of Cartel Strategies in France, Greece, Denmark and Ireland	View Paper Details
New Parties in Advanced Democracies: Causes and Barriers to Participation	View Paper Details