Understanding the logic of EU capacity building

Abstract

Presenters: Philipp Genschel (University of Bremen) Markus Jachtenfuchs (Hertie School) Discussant: Kathleen Mcnamara (Georgetown University) Abstract: The EU evolves from a regulatory to a positive polity, integrating rules, fiscal, coercive, material, and administrative capacities. However, this is challenging for standard theories of European integration. This contribution offers a stylized account with empirical examples of how EU capacity building differs from EU rule making, inspired by but moving beyond liberal intergovernmentalism. Domestic preference formation for capacity building is driven by state elites, mainstream, and challenger parties, not functional concerns or strong interest groups. Existential threat perceptions beyond military security play a crucial role. Interstate bargaining is inefficient, and agreement is difficult. The win-set is smaller than in rule making, and the most needed states are also the most reluctant. Non-ratification is a frequent threat. Institutional choice is not motivated by member states desiring to control themselves through independent institutions in order to assure credible commitment but by their interest in controlling European capacities in order to mitigate the risk of functional failure (high upfront investments lead to dysfunctional institutions), distributive loss (effective European capacities entail strong interstate redistribution) and political drift (strong and successful EU capacities may pursue agendas different from the member states). Overall, capacity building differs strongly from rule making. It is less driven by joint gains but by concerns for control and political power. There is a danger of half-way houses with high symbolism and low problem-solving.