Judicial Authority and Political Intent: Quantitative Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making

Abstract

Courts are political actors, yet systematic evidence on how they exercise authority remains fragmented. We invite quantitative and comparative work testing theories of judicial behavior, institutional design, and political interaction. How to measure judicial preferences, incentives, and constraints? What empirical implications follow from competing accounts of judicial independence, strategic adaptation, and accountability? We welcome contributions that bridge data and theory -- new measures, causal designs, or comparative data -- to illuminate how political intent and legal rules shape judicial decisions.

Title	Details
Exploring Assertiveness: How Institutional Architecture and Political Dynamics Shape Constitutional Court Behavior	View Paper Details
How Court Composition and Organisational Characteristics Shape Asylum Adjudication in Germany	View Paper Details
From Legislative Micromanagement to Litigation Evergreens: The Rise of Privatized Enforcement of European Union Law	View Paper Details
Trust Without Commitment: Public Support for the ECJ in Backsliding Democracies	View Paper Details
Judicial Ghostwriting: Evidence from the Czech Constitutional Court	View Paper Details