The Strategic Dimension of Social Policy Reforms

Welfare state reforms that impose losses on concentrated groups are politically dangerous to implement. They should consequently be accomplished during carefully designed decision making processes leaving policy-makers a number of blame-avoidance opportunities. This hypothesis dominates contemporary welfare state research but is more often suggested than empirically analyzed. Modern research has primarily focused on reform outcomes, and analyzed how and whether decision makers respond properly to a variety of challenges facing modern welfare states and their expanded social policy programs. With this workshop we intend to shed light on the strategic and political dimensions of reforming social policy and popular entrenched policy programs in general. What strategies are for example deployed by elected decision makers when they face the trade-offs between policy-seeking, vote-seeking and office-seeking behaviour? How can decision-making processes be designed strategically to increase the chance of succeeding with a planned reform program? How do policy makers safeguard own political interests while at the same time implement necessary reforms in the welfare state? We welcome papers dealing with these and related topics – preferably in a comparative perspective.