Puzzles of Political Corruption

Abstract

This panel aims to bring together researchers who are faced with the difficult, yet stimulating task of understanding political corruption. Defining corruption is no easy task, but measuring it in an objective way proves even more difficult. Then, once we agree on a certain definition and a certain measurement procedure, we almost inevitably run into problems of endogeneity. Some institutions are said to encourage corruption, but those very institutions may well be the product of certain cultural and social systems, which themselves could be prone to corruption. Also, corruption decreases with economic development, but at the same time it is supposed to harm economic development – then how are corrupt societies able to ever break this “vicious circle”? Among the many open questions in this field, one is under what conditions voters are willing to tolerate corruption. In both the developing (India) and developed world (Italy), voters may be found to consistently vote for politicians charged with malfeasance. The two most common explanations are that voters may not have all the information necessary to take a decision, or may receive benefits from corrupt incumbents – in which case they would rationally endorse a certain level of corruption. Our presenters, for example, could devise a critical test that can help settle the question empirically. Also, another topic that could be explored is the effect of legislative institutions on the level of corruption. According to Vineeta Yadav’s study of developing countries (2011), in legislatures where the party holds sway (as opposed to individual legislators), corruption is more widespread because party costs are higher than that of any one legislator. Is this the case for developed democracies as well?

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