Institutional engineering in divided societies: electoral rules, ethnic quotas, and party systems

Abstract

Institutions may play a decisive role for establishing peace and democracy in divided societies. The consociational (or power-sharing) theory underlines the importance of institutions that ensure representation of all significant ethnic groups (Lijphart 2004). Such institutions include proportional representation (PR) in the legislative elections and inclusive multi-ethnic governments. Often, ethnic quotas are applied for parliaments, governments, and civil service. Yet there is another school that has developed a radically different approach for designing institutions in divided societies. Instead of segregating ethnic groups and encouraging the formation of ethnic parties, institutions need to promote integration of different groups through multi-ethic parties and inter-ethnic vote (Reilly 2001; Horowitz 2003). These scholars underline moderating effects of majoritarian electoral systems and try to bridge inter-ethnic divide through inclusive policies that are not based exclusively on ethnicity, especially through preferential formulas like “alternative vote”. Party systems in divided societies may be structured either along ethnic lines, or according to other, non-ethnic, cleavages (Lipset/Rokkan 1967). Their development can be, at least partially, influenced by electoral systems and ethnic quotas. Typical examples of countries where party systems have been (partially or totally) structured along ethno-linguistic lines are Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, or Spain (see the literature on party nationalisation, i.e. Caramani 2004). While many post-conflict countries are about to democratise, it is important to explore these different approaches and detect implications that they may have in divided societies. The aim of our panel is to enrich this discussion with theoretical and empirical research papers about: - Electoral systems and ethnic quotas. What is the impact of electoral systems in divided societies? What electoral formulas – PR vs. majoritarian – are better suited for establishing and maintaining peace and democracy in culturally heterogeneous countries? Are formal and mandatory ethnic quotas an adequate instrument for ensuring group representation? Are there other ways for achieving the same goal? Party systems. In which cases do political parties reflect ethnic cleavages, and in which do they have a multi-ethnic and integrative character? With what consequences for divided societies? References CARAMANI, Daniele (2004). The Nationalization of Politics. The Formation of National Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. HOROWITZ, Donald L. (2003). “Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers”. Journal of Democracy 14 (4): 115-127. LIJPHART, Arend (2004). “Constitution Design for Divided Societies”. Journal of Democracy 15 (2): 96-109. LIPSET, Seymour Martin; ROKKAN, Stein (1967). “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments. An Introduction”; in: LIPSET, Seymour Martin; ROKKAN, Stein (Eds). Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free Press. 1-64. REILLY, Benjamin (2001). Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Mananagement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

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