Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.
Just tap then “Add to Home Screen”
This panel looks at phenomena of consensus and contention in the realm of bilateral alliances as formal agreements on security cooperation with the US. Specifically, it is interested in such cases where this sort of cooperation links the US to a state identified as enemy throughout the 20th century and where these relationships transformed into or a starting to transform into a security community grounded on dependable expectations of peaceful change. However, the identification of a common threat alone, while incentive to security cooperation and alliances, provides an only unstable ground for communitarian links, which can only be established through a common identity. Our cases focus on the question whether some features of the bilateral relationships linking the US to previous enemies actually show that they have moved beyond instrumental concerns and that they provide a stable ground for a security community. Our cases present a variety of empirical inquiries into the internal dynamics of security cooperation with the US. In Japan, for instance, the specific situation of the US military bases on Okinawa raises contentions that might contradict both governments’ efforts to make their bilateral cooperation one of the most important axes of their security and defence policy. In a similar stance, the participation of Spain in the transatlantic security community led by the US is until today burdened by bilateral issues. Germany’s relations with the US long were less ambivalent, but ever since the Cold War, convergence concerning non-state threats such as “international crime” has been matched with divergences concerning ideas which would imply military action directed against states, as implied by the idea of “rogue states”. Overall, the participants to the panel hope that their case studies will provide insights beyond the realm of bilateral relationships with the US in states that had previously experienced enmity from its part, notably on conditions for the success and failure of security communities.