Subnational Constitutional Politics: Contesting or Complementing, Replicating or Innovating Traditional Constitutionalism?

Abstract

“Methodological nationalism” seems no longer to be a concept able to catch recent developments in European member states. Unitary states have been transformed into federal states (or they are about to do so), federal states have devolved competences to sub-national levels. In other EU member states actors at the sub-national level strive for more rights. In these cases sub-national actors got the chance to set up constitutions, establish non-formal statutes, or make over their already existing sub-national constitution. Sub-national or local forms of self-rule might help to re-attach citizens to the democratic process in a context of fragile democratic traditions, the displacement of national sovereignty, and increasing civic adverseness to national politics (Blokker 2012; Lorenz 2013). Subnational democracy might also work as a partial antidote to efficiency (output legitimation) and legitimacy (input legitimation) problems of European democracies. It can trigger legal innovations and help to clarify the status of such innovative features. So far, these dynamics have been observed mostly from the perspective of the federal or national level. From this angle more often than not sub-national constitutions are treated just as “devolved” law. But this approach cannot explain, e.g., why in the very same state some sub-national units are far more active than others as far constitutional politics is concerned. Quite similarly, this approach does not tell us anything on the varying issues tackled with in constitutional politics (Lorenz and Reutter 2012). Our panel will will look at these issues from a sub-national and/or regional angle. We strive to establish a dialogue between scholars who deal with these issues. They will focus on and explore the relationship between national and sub-national constitutional politics. The panel will provide a forum for analytical and comparative studies.