Deliberative Experiments and Constitutional Changes: Theoretical and Empirical Approaches

Abstract

Constitutional reform processes are usually undertaken to establish a democratic government, to adjust various types of institutions and their functioning, or/and to address major societal problems. As citizens are directly affected by such changes, the last two decades have witnessed an increased concern towards granting popular participation in the constitutional reform. This move towards inclusiveness had a double task: to boost the legitimacy of reforms, and to restore the belief that the demos has an effective voice in contemporary democracies. These tendencies emphasize the value of constitutions as “projects of social life” (Zagrebelsky, 2010). In recent years, the public involvement has gradually evolved from consent (i.e. the approval of the new constitution through a popular referendum) to consultation and the opportunity for citizens to provide input during the reform process. The latter has involved deliberation under various forms such as crowdsourcing, commons-based peer production, citizens’ forums, mini-publics. Based on these recent developments, our panel focuses on deliberative experiments in constitutional reform at national level and has two major objectives. First, it aims to understand how deliberative mechanisms work in various political settings, and to explore and explain differences. The second key objective is to identify the causes of particular forms of deliberation and to assess their effects on legislation, politics, and polity. The aim here is to establish whether certain types of deliberation also lead to particular consequences. Our panel combines theoretical papers firmly grounded in theories of deliberation and constitutional reform with empirical papers (both single-case and comparative studies) with emphasis on four European countries supporting deliberative procedures in constitutional reform: Hungary, Iceland, Romania, and Turkey.