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There is little doubt that the recent financial and economic crisis elevated the public profile of central banks. Since the onset of the crisis in the summer of 2007, central banks have been on the front line of efforts to fix dysfunctional financial markets. To achieve this aim, central banks have significantly stretched the boundaries of traditional monetary policies and taken on new financial regulatory responsibilities. Central banks’ activism and extended powers have attracted public criticisms and political concerns. Some have questioned whether ultra-loose monetary policy is generating new credit bubbles or creating conditions that encourage fiscal profligacy. Others have raised concerns on the maintenance of political independence at the time when central banks’ monetary and financial stability policies have entered into quasi-fiscal territory. The process of exiting from unconventional monetary policies is also contentious, especially in light of the global spillover effects that such processes entail. This workshop taps into these debates by furthering and expanding the analysis of central banking. In particular, the workshop aims at developing a thorough understanding of the politics and policies of central banks in both advanced and developing economies. Attention will focus on identifying the institutional and political-economy factors that shape central banks’ choices in both normal and crisis times. The channels through which central banks develop their analyses and implement their policy preferences as well as the domestic and international consequences also need to be thoroughly investigated. The workshop will also shed light on the challenges and opportunities for central banks’ independence and democratic accountability.
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Explanations and Accountability: An Analysis of UK Parliamentary Oversight of Monetary Policy, Financial Stability and Fiscal Policy, 2010-15 | View Paper Details |
Writing its own Rulebook: The European Central Bank and the Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis | View Paper Details |
Bureau Shaping by Central Banks: Explaining Bureaucratic Preferences and Political Autonomy in the Bank of England since the Financial Crisis | View Paper Details |
Central Bank Learning from the Global Financial Crisis | View Paper Details |
Too Little, Too Late? What European Central Bankers Do - and Why | View Paper Details |
Monetary Policy in Hard Times. The Political Permissibility Space of Central Banks’ Reaction Function | View Paper Details |
How do Central Banks Learn? Political and Institutional Dynamics of Post-Crash Policy Change | View Paper Details |
The European Central Bank and the Sovereign Debt Crisis | View Paper Details |
Uncharted Territory: The European Central Bank’s Role in the Troika | View Paper Details |
Rules Versus Discretion Across Microprudential, Macroprudential and Monetary Policy | View Paper Details |
The ECB and Eurozone Monetary Politics: Policy Consensus in EMU Revisited | View Paper Details |
Managing Shadow Money | View Paper Details |
Ideational Ecologies in Central Banking: Ideas and Esteem at Jackson Hole | View Paper Details |
The Evolution of the ECB's Accountability During the Euro Area Crisis | View Paper Details |
Beyond Stability: The Political Sources of Widening Central Bank Mandates in Developing Countries | View Paper Details |
Of the State but Not the State: Placing Central Banks in the Global Financial Crisis | View Paper Details |
Solving 'Too Big to Fail': The Role of the ECB in Reforming EU Bank Resolution and Bank Structures | View Paper Details |
Monetary Trust and the Politics of Central Bank Transparency | View Paper Details |
Institutions, Politics and the Changing Role of the European Central Bank in the Multilevel Governance Framework of the European Union | View Paper Details |
Rethinking Credible Commitment: Economic Ideas and Central Banking | View Paper Details |