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Negotiating EMU Reform in the Context of the Euro Crisis: The Diversification of Decision-Making Dynamics and their Consequences

European Politics
Euro
Negotiation
Institutions
European Union
10
Derek Beach
Aarhus Universitet
Uwe Puetter
Europa-Universität Flensburg
PP Panel

In the wake of the Euro-crisis the EU since 2009 has witnessed an unprecedented increase in the domestic salience and sensitivity of EU-issues in member states. The crisis has exposed deep structural flaws in the design of the Euro-system and especially the economic pillar of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that have to be fixed for it to survive, creating strong functional pressures for reform. Negotiations reforming the Euro-system have therefore been trapped between functional pressures and domestic resistance from voters and national elites wary of transferring more sovereignty. These unprecedented and contrasting pressures have created a different context for EU reform negotiations than in the past, resulting in a reform process that has had a piecemeal and incremental character. This contrasts with previous examples of EU institutional reform which culminated in large-scale revisions of the Treaties, a method member states governments have been reluctant to advocate. Some issues have been dealt with in intergovernmental negotiations (e.g. the Fiscal Compact), whereas others took place using ordinary EU legislative procedures, yet often in an abbreviated form while giving the European Council the de facto position of a policy initiator (six and two pack negotiations). What have the consequences been of these new negotiating modes and their simultaneous coexistence for inter-institutional relations, the respective role of the various supranational actors and member state governments? How can we conceptualize the procedural dimension of EU institutional reform after the crisis? Is EU institutional reform part of a new intergovernmentalism or does it offer novel opportunities for community method decision-making to strive? What are the implications for both negotiation efficiency and balance-of-power aspects? The workshop organisers especially welcome papers which present new empirical evidence and combine empirical and more theoretical questions.

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