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Building: Jean-Brillant, Floor: 3, Room: B-3345
Saturday 14:00 - 15:40 EDT (29/08/2015)
Provided that constitutional review spreads across the democratic systems we need to systematically test the various approaches and theories developed for the US Supreme Court. We expect the papers to follow this perspective; they may comparatively investigate a number of issues such as institution-building, institutional settings, intra-court decision-making, and the relation between courts and other actors. This panel is co-organized by the Law and Courts section of the American Political Science Association.
| Title | Details |
|---|---|
| The German Constitutional court as Veto Player: Composition, Decisions and the Absorption Hypothesis | View Paper Details |
| Constraining the Legislature: Strengths of the Decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court | View Paper Details |
| How Chilean Parties Strengthened Judicial Oversight of a Too-Strong Executive | View Paper Details |
| The Choices Courts Make - Domestic Courts as Political Actors in the European Union | View Paper Details |