Methods in Political Theory and Normative Analysis

This course aims of explore different methodological questions and approaches prevalent in contemporary normative political theory. The course will not cover the methodological approaches that are specific to the history of ideas, including the history of political thought.

Methodological awareness is common in the social sciences and history, but much less so in political theory. In fact, very few articles or books in political theory mention explicitly the methodological commitments their authors use, let alone they include a section on methods. This is regrettable for at least two reasons. First, it is possible that being clearer about the methodological assumptions authors make might help to disperse many disagreements. Second, as a consequence more clarity can help us to locate where the normative, substantive disagreements are. This lack of methodological clarity is due to the fact that methodological issues in normative political theory are partly substantive. That is, choosing a methodological approach is not disconnected to the substantive claims political theorists aim to make. Ronald Dworkin defends an extreme version of this claim. He holds that all methodological issues (including meta-ethics) are fully substantive.

The course starts by revising the type of questions that political theorists usually get involved with, and the structure of normative political theory. It is only natural to think that before we can make methodological decisions, we need to know the subject matter of political theory. It is possible to distinguish between three different types of questions. First, we might want to ask about the value of certain state of affairs. We can evaluate the world (or possible worlds) according to how valuable they are: how much goodness or badness exists. These are axiological questions. Second, we might want to ask about when people are blameworthy or praiseworthy for their actions (or omissions). These are attributive questions. Third, we might want to ask how we should act: what we owe to others (or to ourselves). This narrow set of questions is normative in the sense that they give us reasons for action. We might also want to ask whether normative principles are person affecting or not. Clarifying the structure of political theory in this way might shed light into some of the methodological commitments that can guide us when we address substantive questions.

A popular strategy in political theory involves analysing political concepts. The hope is that clarifying the nature of central concepts to political theory will resolve the normative issues we face. For instance, a theory of political freedom might be developed and defended by analysing the concept of freedom and its relation to other political concepts such as equality, authority, power, etc. Although this approach has been subject to significant criticism, it is still widely used not only in political theory but in political science as well.

On the second day, we turn to ‘reflective equilibrium’, a methodological approach that has been extremely influential in the last 45 years. Reflective equilibrium involves seeking coherence between our considered (moral or political) judgements about specific cases and general principles that govern them. Ideally, our judgments would be coherent not only among themselves, but also with the principles that justify and explain them. When conflicts emerge we might need to adjust either by reducing the credence of the particular case or by revising the principle. Reflective equilibrium works back and forth until we secure (full or sufficient) coherence. This approach has been criticised because it relies too much on intuition. Some people might be willing to stick to some of their particular judgments no matter how rational a principle that doesn’t support the judgment seems. Moreover, it might be possible that the plausibility of certain judgments depends on arbitrary facts such as our evolutionary history.

On the third day we touch a related methodological issue. Should facts play any role in political theory? and if so, how much weight should we give them. G. A. Cohen argues that fundamental principles are fact insensitive. This means that principles that can be rejected by appealing to facts rely on other, more fundamental, principles that do not depend on facts. On the other hand, some others think that fundamental principles depend on facts. For instance, if life on Earth was very different than it is, perhaps other principles would be more plausible. In his session, besides trying to understand fact sensitivity we will try to see how it is related to both reflective equilibrium and the nature of concepts.

In the fourth day, we address issues of idealisation. A dominant trend in contemporary political theory starts by developing ideal theories. In this class we will focus on three questions. First, what makes ideal theory ideal, what kind of circumstances, attitudes and behaviours should we idealise. Second, what is the point of ideal theory? Some authors suggest that ideal theory is unnecessary or harmful to provide guidance in the non-ideal world we inhabit. Third, what is the relation between ideal and non-ideal theories? Do the latter depend on the former? If so, what type of dependence there is between them?

Finally, on the fifth day we discuss whether political theory should abandon its moral core. So far, political theory has been presented as a branch of moral theory in the sense of being highly dependent on it. Political realists pledge to construct a theory of politics that is not tightly connected to morality and yet is still normative. Whether they succeed is the topic of this day.

Credit Requirements:
Those wishing to obtain credits. For 1-2 credits a 30 mins presentation to be decided on the first day (in case there are more students than slots, then we’ll find a suitable arrangement). For 3-4 credits: a presentation and a 4000 paper.

This is an introductory course to methods in contemporary political theory. Although no prerequisite knowledge is required, some familiarity with contemporary analytical philosophy would be an advantage.