Policy-making and Cohabitation in Semi-presidential Democracies

Abstract

In the past, cohabitation was blamed for governance problems and political instability. This panel welcomes proposals for empirical reconsiderations of these links, which could focus, for example, on the impact of cohabitation on policy-making, legislative efficiency and productivity, and inter-executive conflict (Lazardeux 2015). Important questions may be raised in this context about whether cohabitation periods are associated with moderate policies closer to the status quo or even legislative gridlock, in line with veto-player theory (Tsebelis 2002). The impact of cohabitation on policy stability could be a related research avenue. In terms of methodological approaches, large-n and small-n approaches are equally welcome, as well as theory guided approaches drawing on veto player readings of cohabitation (Leuffen 2009). The study of policy-making under conditions of divided government is welcome in a wide range of semi-presidential environments, at different levels of governance.