Representation, Judgment and Constituent Power

Abstract

Acknowledging the lack of objective benchmarks for democratic action, scholars increasingly define the quality of representative systems in terms of citizens’ capacity for judgment and resistance (i.e. their capacity for objecting to the representative claims made in their name). This focus on resistance differs from traditional approaches to democratic representation which considered both citizens’ equally weighted vote (“one citizen, one vote”) and specified ways in which citizens’ preferences should be aggregated (such as, majority rule). The contemporary focus on resistance makes sense from a constructivist perspective – leaving it to the people to (re-)define the terms by which it seeks to govern itself. However, one cannot help but wonder if such focus does not unduly favour the deliberative functions of representation; relegating considerations regarding fair interest aggregation to the side. This panel welcomes papers that explore this question, unpack the implications of contemporary conceptualisation of constituent power, and clarify its relation to the principle of democratic self-rule.