The Accountability of Regulators

Abstract

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) are often criticized for being technocratic bodies that evade democratic accountability. To this criticism it is equally often objected that the independence of agencies does not prevent them from being accountable for their performance to various “forums”. Hence it is necessary to evaluate empirically the accountability of such bodies, and to take into consideration that their de facto accountability may differ from de jure accountability procedures that are described on paper. This panel welcomes empirical papers that assess the effective accountability of IRAs, and especially comparative work since the accountability of IRAs varies both across states and across policy sectors. It also welcomes papers assessing the accountability of regulators beyond the nation-state, such as EU agencies, regulatory networks, private regulatory bodies, etc. The papers should focus on who exactly is accountable, for what, through what kind of procedures, and to whom; they should accurately describe account-giving activities and reactions to them. In sum, the submitted papers should seek to identify the accountability “regimes” or “networks” in which regulators are embedded. They should also evaluate under what conditions and to what extent the “shadow” of accountability is effective, and offer theoretically informed explanations of any observed variations.

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