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International institutions have acquired an almost obvious presence in international politics. Remarkably, they come in such diverse forms as international organizations with permanent secretariats and nearly universal membership (such as the United Nations) and bilateral agreements in a specific policy field (such as bilateral investment treaties). Some are highly legalized (such as the World Trade Organization), while others only foresee consultations among the members in case of dispute. Originally researched under the flag of regime analysis, and more recently, under the flag of the rational design of international institutions, this workshop aims to build on and critically engage with the existing literature on international institutions, by inviting theory-guided empirical research, whether in the form of single case studies, comparative case-studies across institutions or over time, or large-N quantitative analyses. Our workshop proposes to tackle the twin questions of (1) why the design of international institutions differs so widely in terms of institutionalization, legalization, flexibility, and degree of delegation, as well as (2) whether and how this variation in institutional arrangements matters for forms of political interaction and policy outcomes.
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The Interaction of International Institutions from a Social Network Perspective | View Paper Details |
Bounded Rational Policy Diffusion: The Case of Bilateral Investment Treaties | View Paper Details |
Hubs of Governance: Higher-order Effects of PTA-Formation | View Paper Details |
Explaining the Transnational Design of International Organisations | View Paper Details |
Transnational Actors in International Organisations: Access, Information, and Influence | View Paper Details |
The Design and Consequences of Collegial Governance in the European Coal and Steel Community, 1950-1955 | View Paper Details |
Dispute Bodies with Teeth: An Exploration of the Sources of Authoritative Dispute Settlement in International Organisations | View Paper Details |
Institutional Design of Global Governance: Power and Autonomy of the Heads and the boards of International Governmental Organisations | View Paper Details |
Delegation of Power to International Organisations and Institutional Empowerment over Time | View Paper Details |
An Organisational-Cybernetic Approach to the Design of International Institutions | View Paper Details |
The World Trade Organisation: Less Legalised and More Political than Assumed? | View Paper Details |
Credible Commitments and International Organisations: Democratic Clauses in Regional Integration Organisations | View Paper Details |
Improving Their Standing: How Regional Hegemons make use of Institutional Design | View Paper Details |
International Institutions and Domestic Coalitions: Negotiations, Judicialisation and Collective Action in Trade Policy | View Paper Details |
Trust as a Cause and an Effect of Institutional Design Features | View Paper Details |
The Changing Design of International Non-Proliferation Institutions | View Paper Details |
Regional Economic Organisations and Security Institutions in a Comparative Perspective | View Paper Details |
The Effects of Institutional Design: Preferential Trade Agreements and Trade Flows | View Paper Details |
Peering at the Peers: How do Peer Reviews among States take Shape in Four International Organisations? | View Paper Details |
Comparing International Finance and Security Regime Complexes | View Paper Details |
The Centrifugal Reproduction of the World Health Organisation | View Paper Details |