Regulatory Enforcement and Courts

Abstract

Independent regulatory agencies occupy a central role in policy implementation and enforcement. While independent regulatory agencies have been the object of scholar attention, we still know relatively little about how their day-to-day work is shaped by courts. In particular, this under-explored judicial dimension has implications in policy implementation styles and in the relationship between regulators and regulatees. Concretely, this panel investigates how the decisions and sanctions by independent regulatory agencies are supported or restrained by judicial authorities. Privileging an empirical and comparative approach, the panel includes papers that analyze the scope and intensity of judicial review on administrative decisions made by regulatory agencies. To what extent and by which kind of target groups are enforcement decisions contested? What are the chances of overturning regulatory decisions in court? How does the judicial review of enforcement decisions affect policy implementation strategies? The panel addresses these questions with a series of empirical papers focusing in Western Europe and covering multiple policy fields.