In comparative political science, the current debate stopped discussing protracted transitions, diminished subtypes of democracy as well as hybrid regimes and is now focussing on what is called “new authoritarianism”. The work at hand wants to contribute to answers of the question, why authoritarian regimes persist. Its focus lies on the strategy of adaptation: Instead of implementing democratic rules, authoritarian leaders preserve their power through adaption of these rules. The paper concentrates on the role of key actors (in the case of Kenya: the president) and their interaction with institutions. The view is hold, that after actors completely ignored institutions which should bring democracy, actors now implement them in diverse ways to maintain their authoritarian regime. As a result, three different forms of instutions can be identified: 1. new institutions detached from their original meaning, 2. supposed democratic institutions with limited meaning and 3. supposed democratic institutions with full meaning, but still serving the authoritarian regime. Hence, modern authoritarian leaders differ from former “mock-democrats”, who gave no sense to democratic institutions at all. The case of Kenya, especially in the 1990s and following decade, is a good example for clarifying the permanence of authoritarian regimes. In contrast to the assumption of democratic transition, the authoritarian regime persists despite elections are held and a new president is inaugurated. The present work gives insights to the political system of the independent Kenya. Therefore the presidencies of Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki are examined as well as the president’s influence on the constitutional reform process.
