Even more so than in other new democracies, political parties in Africa are thought to be weak, also because of ethnic voting. Many scholars think formal institutions in Africa are of little relevance for understanding political life and therefore the interest in political parties is limited. Those who do study African political parties generally accept the usefulness of “universal” party typologies, for example Gunther and Diamond’s (2001), but no empirical research has been done to actually apply these models. This paper, based on a project proposal, breaks new ground by applying the European literature on the cartel party to Africa. The paper sketches a new research agenda highlighting the relationship between the state and political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa. Starting point, following Carothers (2006), is the highly abbreviated genealogy of political parties in democracy’s third wave. In the context of underdevelopment and neo-patrimonialism, this paper argues, in Africa electoralist parties look for survival to the state. This dynamics, which could be observed to a lesser extent in post-communist Eastern Europe, lends many African parties the features of the European cartel party: dependence on state resources, a concentration of power in the party in public office, lack of programmatic competition, weak parties, increasing importance of state regulation, a shrinking political arena, and collusion. There are also differences. Patronage and clientelism are more important than state subventions. It is donors who set limits to the political space in Africa. Practices of collusion (a good example is Nigeria) should be distinguished from the actions of dominant (authoritarian) party systems. Still, it is precisely the systematic application of the party cartel model to Africa that brings out the similarities and differences. With the party cartel theory, we can begin to evaluate the impact of this trend on the functioning of democracy in the region.
