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Lessons from the Past: East German and Polish Opposition


Abstract

In light of the recent celebration of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break up of the Soviet empire, it is interesting to examine what we learned (or did not learn) from the oppositional movements in former Eastern block. Their victory over the communist system in 1989 didn’t mean the end of their existence. The dissidents in both countries continued to exist and started to play an official role in political life. It is quite interesting and important to ask what went right and what went wrong given that these movements continue to be a model for other dissident groups. In the 80s, both East Germany and Poland were communist countries and both had been dependent on the URSS; however, they were very different. The Eastern German dissidence developed slowly and differed profoundly from the Polish one. In fact, East German dissidents hardly made contact with the Polish democratic opposition but fixed their attention more on West German organisations instead. How do we account for these divergent outlooks? We should start with the general approach of the intellectuals from both countries toward communism. While in Poland intellectuals such as Milosz, Kuron, and Kolakowski had for the most part switched camps by the 60s, their German counterparts continued to consecrate communism as the best way to stop National Socialism and prevent its redemption for much longer. Leading intellectuals such as Bertold Brecht and Christa Wolf maintained their loyalty to the Party for a rather long time. The slogan “Lieber rot als tot” was well-known in East Germany. Consequently, the fundaments of opposition were different in both countries. In addition, another difference one should not forget is the well developed STASI network in the GDR. Given the differences, it becomes easier to understand the apparent lack of connection between the two movements. However, were these pro-democracy movements connected at least to some degree? Did they learn from each other? Also after 1989 their ways were different, at least in the first period. While in Poland the active members of the anti-communist opposition played or are still playing a role in political or intellectual life, in the German case the dissidents’ destiny was different. Citizen movements that had origins in the oppositional circles of East Germany were marginalized and disappeared quite quickly. Today, the former dissidents play a very small role in political and cultural life in Germany. This is partially due to the fact that East Germany was simply “incorporated” into West Germany. The majority of the East German population didn’t want any more experiments and wanted the reunification. When speaking about die Wende and 1989 we often hear about a “missed opportunity” for a so-called “third way”. This took different forms in both analyzed countries: in the Polish case the communist system was very quickly replaced by “wild capitalism” and failed to leave space for a “third way”. In Germany, as declares Wolfgang Templin “they built too many highways and left people behind. The social transformation wasn’t assured.” Another key factor during a revolution is a symbol. The Germans had the very spectacular fall of the Berlin Wall, but the Polish transition occurred without “taking the Bastille,” without a symbolic event that would have a big psychological impact. The two-and-a-half months of negotiations at the round table couldn’t replace a spectacular event, which would symbolize the end of communism. However, the differences between oppositional parties after 1989 should not be exaggerated. Certainly, between Poland and East Germany there is a big difference but if we look more closely at other post communist countries, the situation is more similar. We can observe the same phenomenon everywhere: the oppositional movements lost their support and were transformed into a pallet of traditional political movements: conservatives, social democrats, Greens, etc. The parties took control and the civic movements disappeared. The changes in Eastern Germany were simply more brutal and faster. A good understanding of the problems that the dissidents met during the “birth phase” and in the first moments of their “official” existence could help us to avoid a lot of problems.