In Force and Freedom, Arthur Ripstein insists that, ‘Freedom, understood as independence of another person’s choice, is [all] that matters’ politically. In this paper I suggest that this premise leads Ripstein to an instrumentalisation of democracy which neglects a properly public and collective notion of freedom. The paper criticises Ripstein’s use of two arguments against any extension of public purposes, beyond the upholding of persons’ ‘independence of others’ choice.’ Neither rightful honour, nor arguments based in the impossibility of ‘mandatory virtue,’ rule out such an extension, so long as constitutional rights are upheld. More constructively, the paper outlines how a space between right and ethics may be opened up when people deliberate in order to form and pursue democratic purposes. I suggest that Kant’s notion of an ethico-civil condition (formally parallel to that of a juridical and rightful condition) might be developed to articulate the shared project that citizens thereby engage in. They participate in relationships, associations and institutions by which they promote shared, ethical ends, without directly submitting to coercion or sacrificing mutuality in human relations.
