In this paper, I develop a critique of theories of global justice that spring from the work of John Rawls. I take Habermas’ criticism of Rawls as a starting point. Habermas, in his 1995 exchange with Rawls in the Journal of Philosophy, argued that Rawls’ A Theory of Justice was guilty of sneaking in a substantive conception of the good life. I believe that this Habermas’ criticism of Rawls can be extended to theories of global justice. For instance, Thomas Pogge tries to show that Rawls’ theory of justice needs to be supplemented by a theory of global justice. Not only do states have an obligation to help each other in emergencies, but, because state actors are also responsible for much of the poverty in other countries, they owe, at a minimum, a negative duty to other states. I go one step further than Pogge, and argue that it is not enough to claim that nation-states have a duty to compensate other nations for damages caused. After all, Pogge has argued that nations, as institutions, owe a negative duty to other states, to offset their roles in creating harm. I will argue that this conclusion is too narrow. It depends on a certain conception of the moral self-understanding of citizens that is also tied to contingent facts about the development of a secular, Westphalian world (in making this argument, I draw on G.A. Cohen’s work in Rescuing Justice and Equality). The distinction between the responsibilities of individuals and of states is based on particular historical facts. I argue that Pogge is too conservative in his interpretation of the duties we owe others.
