In a time when we “rediscover bureaucracy”, does patronage matter? Weber’s theory of bureaucracy argues that bureaucracy is the most efficient form of organization. Bureaucratic efficiency is achieved through a system of recruitment and appointment that is merit-based and non-politicized, also known as neutral competence. However, in real terms, merit ceases to be the only criterion governing the appointments to the public sector. Loyalty to a political party—or a political principal in general—is another operating principle of public appointments, and forms the backbone of a patronage system whereby political loyalty replaces merit or seniority in public appointments. Patronage, narrowly defined as political appointments, is situated at the heart of the longstanding debate concerning merit versus loyalty (political criteria) in public decisions, and thus, is also related to the debate on the “appropriate” role of bureaucracy in a democratic polity. This paper aims to make a number of contributions to the panel. First, by linking old-school conceptualization of patron-client relations with modern-day practice of political appointments, I will argue that it is possible to think of patronage outside the corruption-box. It will be theorized that at the hands of incumbent elected officials, patronage becomes a resourceful tool that offers a solution to the principal-agent problem by minimizing the uncertainty and risk associated with making appointments. Within a fragmented and ever-expanding state, patronage becomes an important organizational and political resource that governments exploit to tighten their grip on the bureaucracy and to ensure “responsive” competence without having to crossover to the boundaries of corrupt political behavior. Second, an attempt will be made to test the Weberian hypothesis that an increase in political appointments undermines efficiency. From an efficiency point of view, the paper will then reflect upon the merits of ‘merit’ and ‘loyalty’ as the two contending criteria for appointments.
