This paper focus on the Brazilian case to investigate if its personal-vote electoral system (PR open list), where candidates typically face intra-party competition in their states (that are also the electoral districts), encourages local/municiapl electoral strategies, parochialism and pork barrels. One of the most classic criticisms to candidate-centered electoral systems, even plurality vote with small magnitude districts, is the risk of excessive localization of politics. Expressly, the parochialization of policies and resources by legislators whose electoral support relies on well delimited and often small geographic locations. The proportional representation system with open list, as adopted in Brazil, has been matter of the same concern by the literature – but should the localization of electoral strategies, resources and support be expected just due to the personal voting even in a system not based on numerous small districts and with hundreds of candidates per state? I analyze four Brazilian elections to the national Lower Chamber (1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010) with vote results disaggregated at the municipal level, verifying if candidates have or not have geographical demarked bases of voters in a SMD-like pattern. I present results for winners and losers, for all parties, by state, to draw a pattern of electoral behavior in the Brazilian electoral system. Results point that personalized voting truly opens room for localized electoral politics, what would be difficult with partisan voting for non-regionalist parties. But does not lead to it, as the majority of Brazilian deputies were elected with votes well spread through the territory.
