The Global Governance Group/3G Initiative: Locating the Collective Response of Small States to the G20 through the Themes of Solidarity and Mixed Coalitions

I propose to examine the manner by which a group of small states has responded to the G20 summit process through the emergence of the 3G or Global Governance Group. This initiative taps into two very different bodies of literature about small state diplomatic behavior. Through one thematic perspective, this collective diplomatic effort can be located in the literature that privileges the ‘solidarity’ approach from the ‘global South’ as expressed via the Group of 77. From this perspective, the best way to advance the cause of small states is through force of numbers. Only by this means can structural weakness and vulnerability be overcome. By way of contrast, the 3G can also be taken to showcase a number of themes that come out of an alternative body of literature with an emphasis on resilient adaptation through the embrace of strategic alliances. From this perspective, there is a willingness (or even a requirement) of small states to push the limit of innovative activity. Supplementing this focus on vulnerability/resilience is a concern with teasing out the motivations for collective behavior. Vulnerability is commonly linked in the literature with a search for an alternative form of global governance. As with the earlier solidarity initiatives around the G77 the 3G makes a normative claim that UN- oriented multilateralism is preferable to elite solutions via concerts of power. Yet does the literature over-estimate the normative aspects as opposed to the search for self-help? Small countries appear to possess a variety of motivations for joining the 3G. Some countries (including small European states) were obviously concerned about the loss of privileges not only via the formation of the G20 but the catalytic effect in other modes of reform most notably on IFI restructuring. Other countries it can be contended wanted to offset the upgrading of regional rivals (Qatar vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia but arguably even Singapore in relationship to Indonesia and Chile to Argentina). And the contentious issue of OFCs/tax havens must also be factored in. The central analytical component of the paper deals with the contradiction between the instrumental and normative components embedded in the different literatures. Borrowing from the trade union domestic analogy the ‘solidarity’ of the 3G can be looked at not as a transformative force (separated markedly from the campaign for a Bolivarian revolution as proposed at the UNGA summit in June 2009) but designed as a pressure group intended to win specific concessions from the G20. This more pragmatic approach enhances its instrumental capabilities. Equally though the activity of the 3G reveals the limits on definitions of global governance by small states through the 3G. Although promoting claims of inclusion and transparency this initiative is highly state-centric without any apparent space for civil society. Such as gap diminishes the normative claims of the 3G.