Investiture vote classifies Hungary as a case for positive parliamentarism (Bergman 1993) since the prime minister is elected by majority of votes, upon nomination by the head of state. However, some of the Constitution’s provisions on investiture vote are somewhat ambiguous (e.g. single vote on prime minister and cabinet program before ministers are appointed). In theory, this provides the head of state, who has discretionary power in nomination, a wide room for manoeuvre. By empirical analysis of government formations of 1990-2010, I shall demonstrate, however, that recognition rule and intra-party selection of prime ministerial candidates solve the constitutional ambiguities and limit the head of state. Despite his nomination monopoly (prime minister) and appointment power (ministers), he has neither an agenda-setting power nor he is a veto player. I also show that major political effects of investiture vote’s are comparatively short formation duration and high cabinet duration in Hungary (Comparative Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive).
