This paper argues that transitional justice discourse and practice suffer from a limited conception of memory which reduces the latter to the sphere of the mind and neglects its attachment to the bodily aspects of human existence. This misconception is not unique to the field of TJ thinking but common in memory research; ultimately it goes back to the conceptual dichotomy between body and mind which was introduced by Platonic thinking and is haunting Western thought since then. Contrary to the assertions of this tradition, memory is not »located« in mind, but always incorporated. Drawing on Bergson, the German philosopher and physician Thomas Fuchs distinguishes between implicit and explicit memory. While the latter refers to memory in its common conception as chronologically ordered conscious representations of the past, the former refers to structures of habituation created by past experiences which have inscribed themselves into the structures of the body. The larger part of TJ-thinking addresses only explicit memories; especially as it focusses on truth commissions, post-war trials or other policies designed to uncover painful aspects of a conflictive and violent past in speech. Yet, especially in the aftermath of prolonged violent conflict, implicit memories are highly relevant in the transition process. In prolonged conflicts, people adjust their life to the continuous threat of violence. Structures of the everyday come to be reshaped so as to secure life under the conditions of violence and privation. The aim of this paper is to discuss transitional justice policies against the background of the importance of implicit memories in a post-conflict situation. The theoretical basis of these considerations is recent research on memory inspired by French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, especially the works of Paul Ricœur and Thomas Fuchs.
