This paper aims at analysing the empirical case of the earthquake that stroke the town of L’Aquila and its Province in April 2009, with a particoular focus on the role that the European Union has had in the aftermath of this disaster. This case has been selected because the L'Aquila earthquake represents the biggest disaster since the creation of the EU Solidarity Fund in 2002. The disaster was qualified as a “major natural disaster” under the terms of the Solidarity Fund Regulation and it has recevived the highest grant ever funded. The analysis will concern the three main phases that a continuative and useful disaster policy should take into account, that is prevention, relief and reconstruction both at a State level and at the EU level; it will also point out some severe critics to the way disaster intervention is usually made. That is to say: considering the amount of money that is spent is not enough when it comes to evaluate how a disaster is managed. In the case of L’Aquila the biggest amount of money that comes from the EU Solidarity Fund - about 350 millions of Euro – was spent for a new housing project. A micro level analysis suggests that the European Union and the State of Italy intervention's didn’t take into any consideration local communities neither in the early aftermath of earthqauke nor in the phase of reconstruction. Reconstruction – not of the city itself but of temporary housing – follow the same path as prevention in L'Aquila and it is the result of a very top-down decision-making process where no space was granted to citizens' involvement and participation, being likely to transform a natural disaster into a great political failure.
