Small EU member states have expressed strong preference for preserving the rotating presidency as a form of representing and influencing the Union affairs during institutional reform debates and finally they succeeded because rotating presidency was preserved in the Lisbon Treaty. However, the situation in foreign policy making system has changed significantly because presidency institution has lost several competences and can formally serve only as deputy to High Representative. Therefore the key question is what is the scope for ‘exploiting’ presidency function in enforcing member states’ foreign policy preferences? Aim of the paper is to explore the changing dynamics of the presidency function within the foreign policy making system based on study of selected new and old small member states (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden). More precisely the focus is on the investigation of presidency as political entrepreneur, concept introduced by Simonse Bunse, in case of EU enlargement policy. Candidate countries and potential candidates from Western Balkan countries represent also foreign policy priorities of the selected member states and naturally have exemplified also their priorities in EU, especially when preparing for presidency and actually chairing the EU. However, the willingness to widen the EU has decreased since 2004 due to several reasons and changing foreign policy making system further complicates member states’ future ability to enforce their preferences in this area.
