The European sovereign debt crisis and the subsequent joint EU-IMF rescue programmes have established the IMF as an actor in European economic governance. As Member of the so-called troika – also including the European Commission and the European Central Bank – the IMF exercises significant influence on economic policy reforms of the euro area Member States receiving financial assistance. Do these rescue programmes function as a trojan horse for the IMF to indirectly influence European economic decision-making while escaping any European democratic supervision? If so, does the IMF’s influence alter the nature and structure of the European economic governance architecture? Is the application of IMF conditionality with regard to economic policy reforms in some euro area Member States in breach of EU law? What is the impact of the novel role of the IMF in the EU on the ongoing transformation of the European economic governance architecture? Will this role prove to be permanent?
In this paper we discuss these questions in general as well as with a specific focus on the developing efforts to cope with the Greek sovereign debt crisis. Being the most extreme case among euro area Member States receiving aid by the IMF, the example of Greece provides the clearest illustration of the changing characteristics of the role of the IMF in the European economic governance architecture.
