How can parties convince voters to accept or at least tolerate welfare state retrenchment? Rather than staunch welfare state defenders, recent research suggests that the multidimensionality of welfare state beliefs and belief systems more generally opens up channels through which parties can build support for a retrenchment platform. Specifically, research has shown that beliefs about the economic costliness of high spending assuage electoral punishment, suggesting the benefits of an economic frame.
This paper links psychological perspectives on judgment to the literature on the politics of welfare state reform to develop a deeper understanding of the ways voters may judge retrenching parties. Although the literature actually implicitly discusses these different mechanisms of judgment, they have not been explicitly theorized in their own right, nor have their implications for the politics of retrenchment been fleshed out. The paper first develops a classification of mechanisms through which voters may judge retrenching governments. The second part of the paper links these types of judgment mechanisms to political strategies for retrenchment. These strategies are illustrated through empirical examples.
