Ministers enjoy wide powers of appointment in Icelandic central administration which in the past have helped them run clientelistic party organizations in a thoroughly un-Nordic fashion. While recently, the electoral advantages of clientelism seem less apparent than before, political appointments, according to the politicization thesis, remain important for control in the public sector. According to this thesis, which many authorities on the matter subscribe to, decades of public sector reforms have left politicians increasingly powerless in the face of a growing conglomerate of autonomous or semi-autonomous organizations which they are still held accountable for. Responding to this, politicians may attempt to secure their hold and re-claim control through political appointments.
In the paper an attempt will be made to critically assess various aspects of the politicization thesis empirically on the basis of the Icelandic experience. Indicators will be developed with regard to major claims of the politicization thesis regarding the amount of administrative reforms, reduced power of politicians and their actual accountability across different policy sectors. The findings are compared to the amount and type of politicization which has actually taken place.
