The Clientelistic Triangle: Parties, Funding Legislation and Public Resource Allocation in Romania

Political clientelism has been defined as the distribution of selective benefits to individuals or groups in exchange for political support. So far, many studies have accounted for systemic determinants and little attention has been paid to resources outside the political system (e.g. economic actors). To fill this void, our paper reveals the mechanisms through which clientelism can alter the governing process in a new democracy through preferential resource allocation. The central argument is that the effects of clientelistic practices on public policies are mediated by the relationship between incumbent political parties and their campaign contributors. The latter benefit from public procurement procedures and supply direct support to the party’s organizations or leaders. To illustrate how this mechanism works we focus on post-2000 Romania, a crucial case for the study of clientelism due to the high number of references to this process in the media and international reports. Our empirical study uses a combination of process tracing and qualitative content analysis on the basis of official public records, legislation, and interviews with political elites and experts. The paper brings two contributions to the existing literature. At theoretical level, it adds a new analytical layer by exploring the link between political parties and economic actors. Second, from an empirical perspective, in addition to the classic clientelism in which voters are the final beneficiaries, the involvement of economic actors can lead to an exploitative clientelism in which most resources are concentrated in the hands of political and economic elites.